Abstract-In computer networks, multicast models a class of data dissemination applications, where a common data item is routed to multiple receivers simultaneously. The routing of multicast flows across the network may incur a cost, and such a cost is to be recovered from payments by receivers who enjoy the multicast service. In reality, a group of potential multicast receivers exist at different network locations. Each receiver has a valuation for receiving the multicast service, but such valuation is private information known to itself. A multicast scheme asks each potential receiver to report her valuation, then decides which subset of potential receivers to serve, how to route the multicast flow to them, and how much to charge each of them. A multicast scheme is stragegyproof if no receiver has incentive to lie about her true valuation. It is further group strategyproof if no group of colluding receivers has incentive to lie. We study multicast schemes that target group strategyproofness, in both directed and undirected networks. Our main results reveal that under group strategyproofness, a compromise is necessary in either routing optimality or budget balance. We also design multicast schemes that pursue maximum budget balance while guaranteeing group stragetyproofness and routing optimality.
dimension of constraint into the multicast problem, and makes optimal algorithm design even more challenging.
In a previous work [18] , we studied multicast routing where information flows are selfish and always select routes that minimize their respective cost. We consider selfish multicast receivers instead in this work. In the market of a multicast network, payments are collected from flows or receivers and paid to links. A multicast solution contains a flow routing scheme and a cost sharing scheme that can be applied to any set of potential receivers. Cost shares collected from receivers are used to cover flow costs at links across the network. Each user has a (potentially different) valuation of the multicast service, known to itself only. The key challenge is to induce receivers to report their true valuations, for better deciding whom to serve, and how much to charge [17] , [19] , [20] . A strategyproof mechanism is one in which each user's dominant strategy [21] is to tell the truth, i.e., lying will not provide any benefit to her own interest. A group-strategyproof mechanism is one that is robust against collusion.
It has been shown that the key toward group strategyproofness is to have cross-monotonic cost sharing, where each user's payment smoothly decreases as the service set expands [19] , [20] , [22] . Cross-monotonicity is known to be a crucial property that fosters collaboration. Intuitively, under a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme for multicast, a receiver is not motivated to not have another receiver served, since a shrinking receiver set can only lead to a larger cost share for itself. Conversely, she welcomes other receivers to join the multicast service, since an expanding receiver set may only decrease everyone's service charge. Section 2 describes a universal way of translating a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme to a group-strategyproof mechanism.
Beside cross-monotonicity, we would like to also pursue optimality in flow routing, i.e., keeping the routing cost to be shared as low as possible, and a balanced budget, i.e., recovering the flow cost from user payments. Multicast schemes we develop are also in-core [23] , i.e., no users in the service set have incentive to secede and build their own solution, and satisfy the no-positive-transfer property [1] , i.e., cost shares are never negative.
We study cross-monotonic multicast in both directed and undirected network models, and provide positive and negative results that complement each other in each model. We depart from the previous de facto standard in crossmonotonic mechanism design, where a pair of corresponding primal and dual solutions are simultaneously manipulated and used in the solution [20] , [22] , [24] , [25] . We compute the primal solution (flow routing) and the dual (cost sharing) independently. The advantage is that we are not obliged to resolve the conflict between primal optimality and dual smoothness. The trade-off is that we need to bound the size of the dual, from both above and below, using the cost of a primal to which it is not directly coupled.
It was observed that the integrality gap in the linear optimization model of a game usually implies an upper bound on the cost recovery ratio of any cross-monotonic scheme for that game [24] , [25] . The presence of exact LP models for multicast [12] , [18] suggests some hope on exact budget balance. However, we show that, unfortunately, optimality, cross-monotonicity, and budget balance are not simultaneously feasible in general, and relaxing the exact budget balance requirement is, therefore, a necessary compromise. For directed networks, we design a simple multicast scheme that is optimal, cross-monotonic, and 1 kbudget-balanced, where k is the number of potential receivers. We further show that no cross-monotonic scheme can always recover a constant fraction of the optimal multicast cost. We design a network pattern based on a complete l-partite hypergraph, with each hyperedge replaced by a gadget tailored for the multicast game. We then apply a probabilistic method [24] , [26] to show that the budget balance ratio of any optimal and cross-monotonic scheme is at most 2 ffiffi k p in this network. We adapt the network pattern and proof technique to undirected networks, and derive a constant upper bound 1 2 on the budget balance ratio for optimal and cross-monotonic multicast schemes, contrasting the diminishing bound in directed settings. We provide insights on such a dramatical difference. Assuming sufficient link bandwidth supply, we further design a cross-monotonic multicast scheme that recovers kþ1 2k fraction of the optimal cost, for a parameter close to 1. This pair of negative and positive results are almost tight against each other, since kþ1 2k is close to 1 2 . The multicast scheme design here is based on smooth dual variable growing, rooted in the primal-dual algorithm design [20] , [22] , [25] . The idea is to trade off the ratio of cost recovery for smoothness in cost sharing. In particular, we make use of the spanning tree game that is cross-monotonic, optimal, and exactly budget balanced [22] . When bandwidth provisioning in the undirected network is frugal instead, we show that the achievable budget balance ratio is Oð 1 Þ, where is a parameter of the network that measures how imbalanced the costs are on interterminal paths.
Our negative results reveal that for achieving group strategyproofness, a compromise has to be made in routing optimality or budget balance. While most of our results are presented in the form of how much a compromise is necessary in budget balance, the multicast scheme designer does have the option of making a similar comprise in routing optimality instead. In Section 4, we show how to transfer a compromise in budget balance into a compromise in routing cost.
We also present a two-stage linear optimization model that pursues the absolute maximum budget balance in specific networks, under optimal routing and cross-monotonic cost sharing constraints. The solutions found vary case by case and do not admit a general characterization, and the associated computational complexity is much higher than that of the general solutions. Experiments in both contrived and randomly generated networks based on this model confirm the theoretically established bounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review previous research in Section 2 and explain the network model and notations in Section 3. Achievable budget balance ratio is studied in Section 4 for directed networks and in Section 5 for undirected networks. Section 4 discusses optimizing budget balance in specific network instances, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Ahlswede et al. [8] initiated the study of network coding, which allows information to be encoded/decoded at any node across the network. The most celebrated result in network coding research characterizes multicast feasibility in directed networks: if a multicast rate d is feasible to each receiver independently, then it is feasible to all receivers simultaneously as a multicast [8] , [9] . Based on this new characterization, efficient algorithms have been designed for optimizing multicast throughput and cost in both directed and undirected networks [10] , [11] , [12] . In contrast to many well-studied problems such as set cover and Steiner tree, which are NP-hard, the multicast cost can be modeled as a linear program and efficiently computed. We, therefore, enforce flow optimality in the multicast schemes discussed throughout this paper.
Moulin and Shenker [19] studied strategyproof sharing mechanisms for costs that are submodular. It was shown that no mechanism can be simultaneously strategyproof, budget balanced, and efficient. An efficient mechanism is one that maximizes net social utility [19] . They described a universal transformation from a cross-monotonic cost sharing (for a cost that is either submodular or not) into a group-strategyproof mechanism, using a simultaneous Cournot tatonnement [27, p. 87] . Basically, for each set of potential users (start with the full set), compare each user's computed cross-monotonic share with her reported valuation. Exclude a user if the latter is smaller and repeat the procedure until the set stabilizes. In such a game, no user has incentive to lie about her true valuation, even in the presence of collusion. For submodular costs, it was shown that the Shapley value [28] method always leads to cross-monotonic sharing. However, multicast cost is not submodular either with or without network coding; it is not even subadditive in one of the network models we study, as shown later. Jain and Vazirani [22] studied cross-monotonic sharing of spanning tree and Steiner tree costs in undirected networks. Based on the dual growing technique rooted in primal-dual algorithm design, they provide an elegant solution for spanning tree that is optimal, cross-monotonic, and exactly budget balanced. This represents the only such scheme known for nonsubmodular costs so far. The primal (tree) and dual (cost shares) solutions together also imply a 1 2 -optimal, cross-monotonic, and 1 2 -budget-balanced mechanism for building a Steiner tree and sharing its cost. Pál and Tardos [20] extended the smooth dual growing technique to facility location and single source rent-or-buy games, resulting in cross-monotonic sharing methods recovering Erdö s and Rényi [26] pioneered probabilistic graph theory research and designed a new method for showing a graph of a certain property exists: instead of constructing a specific instance, which may be hard depending on the property, one may describe a procedure for randomly building graphs and argue that the desired property is satisfied in the output with probability strictly larger than zero [26] , [29] . Immorlica et al. [24] successfully adapted the probabilistic proof technique in analyzing the limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing. They describe random constructions of game instances where the expected cost recovery ratio is low, and therefore establish bounds on the achievable budget balance ratio for games such as set cover, vertex cover, and facility location. We also apply the probabilistic technique in this paper, to derive negative results on cross-monotonic multicast schemes.
In contrast to the directed and undirected wireline network model studied in this paper, a multihop wireless network model is examined by Gopinathan et al. [30] . Each node is assumed to have an omnidirectional antenna that incurs a fixed cost per packet transmission, and network coding is not considered for multicast routing. The broadcast advantage of wireless transmission is nonetheless appropriately modeled. A unit-disk graph example is given to show that no multicast scheme can recover a fraction of the optimal cost that is significantly higher than 1 2 . Then, a cost sharing scheme that does recover 1 8 of optimal routing cost is designed, based on a 4-approximate algorithm to the problem of optimal wireless multicast routing.
NETWORK MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We use a graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ to denote a (directed or undirected) network topology, and vectors w; c 2 Q E þ for link cost and link capacities, respectively. Here, Q þ is the set of positive rational numbers. In a multicast network, S 2 V denotes the sender, T V denotes the set of potential receivers, and nodes in V À fSg À T are relay nodes. k ¼ jT j denotes the total number of receivers. In graphical illustrations throughout the paper, terminal nodes (including S and T ) are in black and relay nodes are in white. We use interchangeably the terms cost shares and payments, a user, and a receiver.
We use vector f A 2 Q E þ to denote a multicast flow from S to a set of receivers A T . When A is a singular set fug, we simply write f u . Under the classic linear edge cost model [31] , [32] , each unit flow on a link uv ! incurs a cost of wðuv ! Þ. A multicast flow f has a total cost of P [12] , [18] , using either general methods such as the interior-point algorithm, or tailored subgradient algorithms with better running times [11] , [12] , [18] . We present the LP for directed networks below; the LP for undirected networks is similar [5] Minimize X 
The LP above assumes that A ¼ fT 1 ; . . . ; T jAj g. The objective function models the total link flow costs to be minimized. The constraints, in order of appearance, model the conservation of conceptual flows, multicast rate requirement, the merging of conceptual flows, and link capacity bounds, respectively [18] . T i S ! is a conceptual feedback link introduced to make the LP compact. N # ðuÞ and N " ðuÞ are the set of downstream and upstream neighbors of u, respectively.
We use y A ðuÞ to represent the cost share of a receiver u 2 A T . A receiver's goal is to maximize the difference between its valuation of the multicast service and the cost share it pays. jf A j ¼ P e wðeÞfðeÞ denotes the cost of a multicast flow f A to receiver set A. jAj denotes the cardinality of a receiver set A. Budget balance can be expressed as P u2A y A ðuÞ ¼ jf A j; 8A T , for a multicast scheme ðf; yÞ. For x 2 ½0; 1, we say a multicast scheme ðf; yÞ is x-budget-balanced if xjf A j P u2A y A ðuÞ jf A j; 8A T , i.e., y always recovers at least x fraction of jf A j but never more than jf A j. y is cross-monotonic if y A ðuÞ y B ðuÞ, 8u 2 B A T . A cost sharing scheme y is in-core if P u2B y A ðuÞ jf Ã B j; 8B A T ; in this case, the potential receivers in B has no incentive to secede and build their own multicast solution. If a cross-monotonic y is x-budgetbalanced with regard to an optimal flow f Ã , then y is automatically in-core.
We say a multicast network has sufficient bandwidth provisioning, if LP (3.1) has the same optimal objective value with or without the constraint in f c; otherwise, we say the network has frugal bandwidth provisioning. A set function g : 2 U ! Q is subadditive if gðA [ BÞ gðAÞ þ gðBÞ; 8A; B U; and is submodular if gðA [ BÞ gðAÞ þ gðBÞ À gðA \ BÞ; 8A; B U. Finally, E x ðgðxÞÞ denotes the expectation of a function gðxÞ over a random variable x.
DIRECTED NETWORKS
We start our study with directed networks, where each link transmits flows in a predetermined direction only. We show that local cost sharing and direct LP dual-based sharing are not cross-monotonic, and provide a simple scheme that is optimal, cross-monotonic, and 1 k -budget-balanced, where k is the number of potential receivers. We prove that no crossmonotonic scheme can recover exactly the optimal multicast cost or even any constant fraction of it, by establishing an upper bound of 2 ffiffi k p on the budget balance ratio, using the probabilistic method. This is in spite of the fact that mincost multicast has exact LP formulations.
Existing Schemes

Local Sharing Is Not In-Core
A local cost sharing method allocates the multicast cost among users in an edge-wise fashion, and the allocation at each edge depends only on the flow rates of users on that edge. For instance, equal sharing [3] , flow proportional sharing, and the Shapely value method [1] , [28] all belong to this category. We use an example in Fig. 1 to show that applying local sharing on f Ã directly is not in-core, and hence cannot be cross-monotonic (note that local sharing may be cross-monotonic if routing is not required to be optimal).
Here, a directed multicast network is shown on the left, each edge is labeled with its unit flow cost. The optimal multicast flow is given on the right, where T 1 has a unit flow on both links and T 2 has a unit flow on ST 2 ! only. In any local sharing,
has incentive not to participate in f Ã , since its share is larger than its own optimal solution jf Ã T1 j ¼ 4. Therefore, the solution is not in-core.
Direct LP Dual is Stabilizing but not Smooth
A cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme is smooth in that each user's cost share is monotonically nonincreasing when the service set expands. In other words, the change of its cost share has no "up-down" and "down-up" saw tooth patterns. Since min-cost multicast has exact LP formulations, it is natural to consider variables in the dual LP for cost sharing. We have used the dual variables for the flow merging constraints in LP (3.1) as multicast cost shares [18] , to successfully enforce selfish multicast flows to stabilize at the min-cost state. Unlike local sharing, LP dual takes into consideration the global network topology and alternate solutions each receiver has. However, in optimal LP solutions, both f Ã A and y Ã A may change dramatically as the service set A T varies, leading to a nonsmooth sharing as A grows. In fact, as we will show in Theorem 3, an optimal, cross-monotonic and budget balanced scheme does not exist; since ðf Ã ; y Ã Þ is optimal and exactly budget balanced, it cannot be cross-monotonic.
We describe a simple multicast scheme in Fig. 2 , which can be applied generally in directed networks with any topology and any link capacity configurations. It uses the optimal multicast flow f Ã A for routing, while charging nodes based on their respective optimal unicast costs in f Ã u . Theorem 1. The multicast scheme in Fig. 2 is optimal, crossmonotonic, and Therefore, a user's cost share can get only smaller in a larger user set, and cross-monotonicity is maintained in the sharing. We next show
In the derivations above,
jAj is based on the celebrated feasibility condition for multicast with network coding [8] , [9] , which decomposes multicast rate feasibility into unicast rate feasibility. More specifically, let f 0 be the union flow of the f 
The final step is to show that P u2A y A ðuÞ jf
The positive result above may appear unsatisfying in that the fraction of cost recovered in the cross-monotonic sharing diminishes as the user group expands. We prove in Section 4.4 a negative result that shows, unfortunately, constant-fraction cost recovery is impossible, given optimal multicast routing and cross-monotonic cost sharing.
We now present a complement multicast scheme design (Fig. 3) to that in the previous section (Fig. 2) . The new scheme makes a compromise in routing optimality instead of in budget balance. Throughout this section, a Theorem 2. The multicast scheme in Fig. 3 is   1 k -optimal, crossmonotonic, and perfectly budget balanced.
Proof. We first show 1 k -optimality in multicast routing
In the equations above, f Ã A denotes an optimal multicast flow to receiver set A. The last inequality is based on the fact that jf Ã v j jf Ã A j, 8v 2 A, and the fact that jAj k. We next show cross-monotonicity. Note that the set of optimal unicast flows f Ã u is computed in Step 1 in Fig. 3 , and then fixed. By Step 4 in Fig. 3 , having more receivers in the set A can only decrease the cost share of a receiver u at a link e ! , and hence u's total cost share can only decrease as A expands. We finally show perfect budget balance. We verify below a stronger statement: perfect budget balance holds at every link in the network
u t Similar to the relation between the multicast schemes presented in Figs. 2 and 3 , in any network setting, the multicast scheme designer has a choice to make a compromise in either budget balance or in routing optimality. In the rest of this paper, we present our results along the lines of approximate budget balance.
An Upper Bound on Budget Balance Ratio:
2 ffiffi k p
We now establish an upper bound on the budget balance ratio of optimal cross-monotonic multicast schemes. We do so by first constructing a network pattern based on a complete l-partite hypergraph, and replacing each hyperedge by a tailored multicast gadget. We then select a user set A to show its cost recovery ratio is at most 2 ffiffi
here, is naturally probabilistic, and the recovered cost is an expected value. The rationale is that since each (multicast) scheme comes with its own weakness and forte, it is hard to construct a deterministic scenario where every scheme performs "badly" [24] . Nonetheless, the low expected cost recovery ratio manifests the existence of a specific (schemedependent) instance of A where the real ratio is not better.
Theorem 3. For any > 0, there does not exist a multicast scheme that simultaneously guarantees optimality, cross-monotonicity, and
Proof. We construct a directed multicast network as shown in Fig. 4 . Terminal nodes in the network include a multicast source S, and k ¼ lh potential multicast receivers grouped into l partites each of size h. For every combination of l nodes each from a different partite, we connect S to them using the gadget shown on the right. The target multicast rate d ¼ 1, every edge has capacity larger than 1. Each edge is labeled with its cost; here, is a small number. We compose the set of multicast receivers A by constructing two subsets A 1 and A 2 , and let A ¼ A 1 [ A 2 . For A 1 : uniformly randomly pick a partite i, include all nodes there; for A 2 : in every other partite, uniformly randomly pick a node and include it in A 2 . We next show that due to limitations imposed by cross-monotonicity, the expected cost recovered from such a randomly chosen set A is at most 2 ffiffi
In the derivations above, 2 is based on crossmonotonicity of y. Here, T ij is uniformly randomly selected from A 1 and E A 2 ;T ij 2A 1 ðy A 2 þT ij ðT ij ÞÞ is the expected Fig. 3 . Cross-monotonic multicast in directed networks-compromise in routing optimality. cost share of T ij within the user set
The following fact is critical in the proof: uniformly randomly picking a user from every partite j 6 ¼ i and then uniformly randomly picking a user from partite i is equivalent to uniformly randomly picking a gadget from the entire network. Each user in the randomly picked gadget will have the same expected cost share
and that leads to ¼ 3 . Observe that the real cost jf Ã A j ¼ h þ ðh þ l À 1Þ. Therefore, the expected cost recovery ratio is
By way of contradiction, assume that for some 0 < < 1, there exists an optimal, cross-monotonic, and ð 2 ffiffi k p þ Þ-budget-balanced multicast scheme. Choose the values for l, h, and based on , such that
we then have
Discussions
The upper bound 2 ffiffi k p suggests that any optimal and crossmonotonic multicast scheme may suffer from poor budget balance in directed networks, since no constant ratio cost recovery is possible in general. This is fundamentally related to the fact that flow transmission on each link is one direction only. Note that in the network in Fig. 4 , links to relay nodes can be shared, and links to receivers are private. At private links, the cost recovery is essentially exempted from limitations by cross-monotonicity-no choice of A would make a node u assume that its private links can be shared, and exact budget balance is always achievable at these links. The global budget balance ratio, therefore, depends on two factors: 1) how small the ratio of budget balance can be forced on shared links by cross-monotonicity, and 2) what is the ratio of shared link cost over private link cost in f Ã . While directed and undirected networks share a similar fate in 1, they differ dramatically in 2. The ratio in 2 can be arbitrarily high for directed networks, leading to a rather poor budget balance ratio. In Section 5, we reveal a different picture for undirected networks.
There is a gap between our positive result (the feasibility of 1 k -budget-balance) and negative result (the upper bound of 2 ffiffi k p on budget balance). To close this gap, one needs to either design a multicast scheme with asymptotically better cost recovery, or prove a tighter upper bound. We leave this as future research. The positive and negative results for undirected networks, as shown next, are almost tight against each other, though. The network pattern in Fig. 4 is also empirically studied in Section 6, where the limitation of cross-monotonicity is illustrated using numerical results.
UNDIRECTED NETWORKS
We now switch our focus to undirected networks. We modify the network pattern in Fig. 4 for the undirected setting, and apply the probabilistic method to derive a negative result again: a cross-monotonic multicast scheme can recover no more than half of the optimal multicast cost in general. Assuming sufficient bandwidth supply, we then apply the dual growing technique [20] , [22] , [25] to derive a smooth cost allocation, which recovers at least kþ1 2k of the optimal cost, and is almost tight against the 1 2 upper bound. For frugal bandwidth provisioning, we show that the achievable budget balance ratio is Oð 1 Þ, where is a network parameter reflecting cost variance among interterminal paths.
An Upper Bound on Budget Balance Ratio:
Theorem 4. For any > 0, there does not exist a multicast scheme that simultaneously guarantees optimality, cross-monotonicity, and ð 1 2 þ Þ-budget-balance in general undirected networks. Proof. We construct a network model similar to the one used in the directed case in Fig. 4 . We still start from a complete l-partite hypergraph. However, each hyperedge is replaced with a different gadget, which is tailored for the undirected case and is shown in Fig. 5 . The new gadget consists of undirected links each of the same unit cost. The target multicast rate is still d ¼ 1 and cðeÞ ! 1; 8e. By randomly picking a subset of receivers A ¼ A 1 [ A 2 in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3, we have that the total expected pay in A E A X T i;j2A
Furthermore, the optimal multicast cost jf Ã A j ¼ 2h þ l À 1. Therefore, the expected cost recovery ratio is 
Now, by way of contradiction, assume that there does exist an optimal, cross-monotonic multicast scheme recovering 1 2 þ of its cost, for some constant 0 < 1 2 . Pick h and l such that
We then have
Note that unlike in the directed case, if links adjacent to receivers have very small cost instead of 1, then arguments in the proof of Theorem 4 would not hold. In particular, receivers in A would interconnect among themselves through relay nodes to get the multicast flow, leading to a smaller jf Ã A j, and a larger budget balance ratio achieved. Private links in f Ã cannot have arbitrarily small costs, otherwise they may be utilized by other receivers as well, since there is no restriction in link direction in undirected networks.
A kþ1 2k -Budget-Balanced Multicast Scheme
We next present a positive result on the achievable budget balance ratio, assuming network bandwidth is sufficiently provisioned. Recall that this means LP (3.1) has the same optimal objective value with or without constraint f c; practically, having cðeÞ ! d at every edge e is sufficient (but not necessary). The case where bandwidth supply is tight will be discussed afterward.
The multicast scheme presented below is optimal, crossmonotonic, and kþ1 2k -budget-balanced. Here, denotes the coding advantage, i.e., the ratio of achievable multicast throughput with network coding over that without network coding, in the specific network [5] , [33] . is proven to be between 1 and 2, and is believed to be close to 1 [33] , [34] . In reality, the observed value for is at most 8 7 for networks with unbounded sizes [34] , is at most 9 8 for small contrived networks [5] , and is essentially always 1 for random networks [5] . Therefore, kþ1 2k should be very close to 1 2 , and this scheme is almost tight given the The cross-monotonic multicast scheme here makes use of the classic spanning tree game [22] that is optimal, crossmonotonic, and exactly budget balanced. We apply this game in the closure graph of G and show that it leads to a cross-monotonic multicast cost sharing in G with approximate budget balance.
For any A T , we first construct a closure graph G 0 ¼ ðV 0 ; E 0 Þ from G ¼ ðV ; EÞ, such that V 0 ¼ A and E 0 ¼ fðuvÞj8u; v 2 Ag, and let wðuvÞ ¼ d G ðuvÞ; 8u; v 2 V 0 be the link cost vector for G 0 . Here, d G ðuvÞ denotes the shortest path length between u and v in G under metric w.
We next run the spanning tree game in G 0 . In this game, each node u is associated with a potential pðuÞ that is initially zero and grows over time. If at time t, for two nodes u and v in different components, pðuÞ þ pðvÞ ¼ wðuvÞ, then edge uv becomes tight and we merge the two components that contain u and v into one. The rate of potential growth at a node u at time t is dpuðtÞ dt ¼ 1 jP u ðtÞj , where P u ðtÞ denotes nodes in the same component as u at time t. The total growing rate of a component is always 1. The game stops when all nodes merge into one component. A spanning tree can be constructed from edges that were ever tight. In the original spanning tree game, each node u 2 A pays R tu t¼0 2 jP u ðtÞj dt; we scale the payment in our game to y A ðuÞ ¼ Proof. Routing optimality of the scheme follows from the definition of f Ã . Cross-monotonicity can be established by observing the following fact: in the spanning tree game, having an extra node in A can only make a node u grow its potential slower, join the source component earlier, and therefore reduce its cost share. We next show kþ1 2k -budget-balance by bounding the ratio between the cost of the spanning tree in G 0 and jf Ã j. Let ðG; c 0 Þ be the capacitied network derived from scaling f Ã :
By the definition of , we should be able to route a multicast flow of 1 in ðG; c 0 Þ without coding, i.e., we can pack at least 1.0 Steiner trees in ðG; c 0 Þ. This manifests the existence of a specific Steiner tree Á in G, such that jÁj P e2E c 0 ðeÞ. Let MST be the tree built in G 0 during the spanning tree game-MST must be a minimum spanning tree in G 0 , since the way it is built is in line with Kruskal's algorithm. The following relation must hold between MST and Á, a Steiner tree in G connecting terminals in A [22] jMST j 2k k þ 1 jÁj: ð5:1Þ
We illustrate the validity of (5.1) with the help of Fig. 6 . Take any planar drawing of the Steiner tree G, connect all terminal nodes in order using links in the corresponding spanning tree G 0 , then connect back to the first terminal. Break the most expensive link in the resulting cycle to form a spanning tree in G 0 . In each face of the graph, the spanning tree edge cost is not more than the cost of the rest of the face boundary, hence the cost of the cycle is at most twice the cost of the Steiner tree; the spanning tree cost is at most k kþ1 fraction of the cycle cost. Therefore, we have
Here, 5 is due to the optimality of f Ã A , the fact that MST can be used to route a multicast flow of 1, and the fact that c represents a sufficient bandwidth supply. 6 is from (5.1). 7 is by the definition of and Á. Equation (5.2) further implies
u t
The Case of Frugal Bandwidth Provisioning
In the previous section, we have assumed that link bandwidth is overprovisioned in the network. We now further discuss the scenario where bandwidth supply in the network is tight to support the desired throughput d. We modify the multicast scheme in Section 5.2 to obtain an optimal, cross-monotonic, and Oð 1 Þ-budget-balanced multicast scheme. Here, is the path cost imbalance factor of the network: let W max ðuvÞ and W min ðuvÞ be the maximum and minimum cost of a simple path connecting two nodes u and v, respectively, then the imbalance ratio between u and v is measured as uv ¼ max uv ðW max ðuvÞ=W min ðuvÞÞ. The path cost imbalance ratio for the network is then ¼ max uv uv . We also show that better than Oð Therefore, we have
and as grows, the budget balance ratio is limited by crossmonotonicity at 3 2þ3 , which is Oð 1 Þ.
The Dual Growing Techniques in Directed Networks
Taking a retrospect at the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5, for directed and undirected networks, respectively, we note the contrasting difference in the cost recovery ratio achieved
We designed a simple multicast mechanism for directed networks, which recovers at least 1 k cost recovery. We designed a sophisticated multicast mechanism with dual growing-based cost sharing for undirected networks, which guarantees constant fraction cost recovery. A natural question to ask is then: Can we borrow the dual growing technique for multicast cost sharing in directed networks, to improve the cost recovery ratio?
Unfortunately, the dual growing technique presented in Section 5 does not work well in the directed setting. In short, in the closure graph used for smooth dual growing, the MST does not represent a reasonable approximation to the optimal multicast cost anymore in the directed setting. Fig. 8 illustrates this problem using an example.
A one-to-two multicast network is depicted in undirected version in Fig. 8a , and in directed version in Fig. 8d . Their closure graphs are shown in Figs. 8b and 8e, respectively. We note that, in the directed setting, there does not always exist a path from every node to every node, and hence, the closure graph may not be complete. Finally, Figs. 8c and 8f show the MSTs in the closure graphs. While the undirected MST has an optimal cost, the directed MST has a cost that is arbitrarily higher than the optimal multicast cost, assuming is a small number 0 < ( 1. As a result, the cost recovery ratio obtained in the directed setting will be arbitrarily close to 0, making the smooth dual growing technique unattractive in its straightforward adaption to the directed setting.
OPTIMAL BUDGET BALANCE IN SPECIFIC NETWORKS
Results from Sections 4 and 5 are about guarantees on the budget balance ratio that general and efficiently computable multicast schemes can provide, while maintaining crossmonotonicity and routing optimality. From a different perspective, it is also natural to ask: What is the absolute maximum budget balance ratio that can be achieved in a specific network? What is the range of such ratios for real networks? How do they compare with the theoretically established bounds? Toward this direction, we show that in a specific network instance, the problem of pursuing optimal budget balance while maintaining cross-monotonicity and routing optimality naturally admits a two-stage linear optimization model. Based on this model, we study the optimal ratio in various directed and undirected network instances.
A Two-Stage Linear Optimization Model
By definition, pursuing maximum budget balance while maintaining optimality in multicast flow routing and crossmonotonicity in cost sharing can be modeled as a two-stage linear optimization. In Stage 1, we compute optimal multicast cost jf Here, the objective function is simply x, the budget balance ratio of ðf Ã ; yÞ. Constraint (6.1) requires the solution in y be x-budget-balanced. Constraint (6.2) establishes cross-monotonicity of y over different service sets A. Constraints (6.1) and (6.2) together also imply that y is incore. The numerical results below are obtained by solving the two-stage linear optimization using the interior-point algorithm as implemented in glpk 4.13 [35]. The maximum budget balance ratio x Ã found by solving the two-stage model is 0.7537 in the directed case, and is 0.9 in the undirected case. This is in line with our previous results showing that better budget balance can be achieved in undirected networks than in arbitrary directed networks, in similar network topologies. Table 1 provides details in the solution ðf Ã ; y Ã Þ, using the directed case as an example. As we can see, the bottleneck sets that limit x Ã from going larger are the ones with cardinality three, each corresponding to the randomly built set A in the proof of Theorem 3. In y Ã , each user in A assumes full cost sharing in some gadget and pays only 0.51, while the total cost in A is 2.03-exactly in line with the probabilistic argument used in Theorem 3.
x Ã in Random Networks
We have computed the maximum budget balance ratio x Ã for various random networks generated using BRITE [36] ; a network topology generator developed at Boston University for simulating Internet-like topologies. Beside undirected networks, we also tested balanced bidirected networks-networks where each pair of neighbors are connected with two directed links, with identical capacity and cost in the two directions. Such balanced network connections are observed in Ethernets as well as in many parts of the Internet core. In the table below, Case (A) is for undirected networks with jV j ¼ 50, and each entry of x Ã is the average value from 5 random networks. Cases (B) and (C) are for undirected networks with jV j ¼ 30; the average x Ã values from 5 networks are given in (B) and the minimum are given in (C). Cases (D) and (E) are for balanced bidirected networks with jV j ¼ 30; (D) lists average values and (E) lists minimum. Bandwidth is sufficiently supplied in each network.
We can see from Table 2 that, due to the bidirected connection nature, balanced-bidirected networks, on average, do not suffer from a much lower budget balance ratio, compared to undirected networks. We can also see that, x decreases as the number of potential users increases in all five cases. This suggests that the limitation exposed by cross-monotonicity on budget balance becomes more stringent with a larger set of potential multicast receivers.
We did not observe very close to zero values for x Ã in the table, which is possible as suggested by Theorem 3 that claims no optimal and cross-monotonic multicast scheme can achieve constant budget balance in directed networks. To achieve very small values of x Ã , we need to test general directed networks that are not balanced bidirected, and test large potential multicast groups. An obstacle for such testings is that our two stage linear optimization model for computing x Ã is computationally expensive, and does not scale well with the size of the multicast group.
We always have 0:5 x 1:0 in undirected networks; the only entry where x Ã drops to below 0.5 is in Case (E), the bidirected setting. This confirms the almost tight bound on x Ã that we established in Theorems 4 and 5. x Ã is high only when jT j is small; as an extreme case, we have always observed x Ã ¼ 1:0 when there are only two potential receivers. Is this just a coincidence? We next show the answer is "no."
Optimal Budget Balance for Two Multicast Receivers
Theorem 6. Perfect budget balance is always feasible for optimal and cross-monotonic multicast to two potential receivers, in a directed network.
Proof. Let T ¼ fT 1 ; T 2 g be the potential receiver set. Let f Ã 1 , f Ã 2 , and f Ã be the min-cost unicast flow to T 1 , the min-cost unicast flow to T 2 and the min-cost multicast flow to T , respectively. We design a multicast scheme as follows: for routing, use f The optimality of the multicast scheme follows from the definitions of f In the derivations above, we have applied the subadditive property of optimal multicast cost in directed networks. A similar inequality holds for the cost share at T 2 . t u
Discussions
The multicast schemes that we studied in Sections 4 and 5 are efficiently computable and are general in that they do not assume any specific information on the network configuration. The two-stage model in this section instead tailors a multicast scheme for each specific input. Such tailored schemes do not have a general characterization, and are extremely expensive to compute-the first stage of the optimization computes exponentially many multicast flows, and the second stage solves an LP with exponentially many constraints. Therefore, schemes in Sections 4 and 5 are more feasible solutions in practice, except for small multicast groups (e.g., jT j 15).
CONCLUSION
We studied in this paper multicast routing and cost sharing schemes that are optimal, cross-monotonic, and budget balanced. The main motivation of cross-monotonicity is to achieve group strategyproofness. We show that exact budget balance is infeasible in general given the other two requirements. We provide both positive and negative results for achievable budget balance in both directed and undirected networks. Our result in the undirected case is almost tight, and is also verified by simulation results in random networks. We show that constant cost recovery is infeasible in general directed networks, while the best guarantee we can have in undirected networks is close to 1 2 -budget-balance. Furthermore, when bandwidth provisioning is tight in undirected networks, the achievable budget balance ratio is also sensitive to the path cost imbalance factor . We finally use a two-stage linear optimization model to compute the maximum budget balance ratio x Ã in various random network instances, and verify that x Ã can be close to 1 only for small multicast groups, and approaches the theoretically proven range soon as the user group grows large. We leave it as future research to close the gap on the upper and lower bounds proven for directed networks.
